In The 80s Crack Epidemic

  
(Redirected from Crack epidemic)
Crack is Wack (1986), mural by Keith Haring

Although it did find that both men were major drug dealers, 'guilty of enriching themselves at the expense of countless drug users', and that they had contributed money to the Contra cause, 'we did not find that their activities were responsible for the crack cocaine epidemic in South Central Los Angeles, much less the rise of crack throughout. Crack epidemic, the significant increase in the use of crack cocaine, or crack, in the United States during the early 1980s. Crack cocaine was popularized because of its affordability, its immediate euphoric effect, and its high profitability. The crack epidemic had particularly devastating effects. It is now axiomatic that although the crack epidemic of the 1980s devastated communities of color, the legal and political responses to the crisis compounded the tragedy. Crack was an inner-city drug, a street-corner drug, a drug of gangs and guns that white America largely experienced from a distance. Jun 25, 2017  It’s no wonder then that the communities hit hardest by the “crack epidemic” of the late ’80s were America’s poorest. In the 1960s, white flight from communities like South Central Los. The invention of crack represented a technological innovation that dramatically widened the availability and use of cocaine in inner cities. Virtually unheard of prior to the mid-1980s, crack spread quickly across the country, particularly within Black and Hispanic communities (Bourgois 1996, Chitwood, et al. 1996, Johnson 1991).

The crack epidemic in the United States was a surge of crack cocaine use in major cities across the United States between the early 1980s and the early 1990s.[1] This resulted in a number of social consequences, such as increasing crime and violence in American inner city neighborhoods, as well as a resulting backlash in the form of tough on crime policies.

In 1986, the U.S. Congress passed laws that created a 100 to 1 sentencing disparity for the possession or trafficking of crack when compared to penalties for trafficking of powder cocaine,[2][3][4][5] which had been widely criticized as discriminatory against minorities, mostly blacks, who were more likely to use crack than powder cocaine.[6]

  • 5Post epidemic commentary
  • 6Influence on popular culture

History[edit]

'Rocks' of crack cocaine, with a ruler (marked in inches) for reference

The name 'crack' first appeared in the New York Times on November 17, 1985. Within a year more than a thousand press stories had been released about the drug. In the early 1980s, the majority of cocaine being shipped to the United States was landing in Miami, and originated in the Bahamas and Dominican Republic.[1] Soon there was a huge glut of cocaine powder in these islands, which caused the price to drop by as much as 80 percent.[1] Faced with dropping prices for their illegal product, drug dealers made a decision to convert the powder to 'crack', a solid smokeable form of cocaine, that could be sold in smaller quantities, to more people. It was cheap, simple to produce, ready to use, and highly profitable for dealers to develop.[1] As early as 1981, reports of crack were appearing in Los Angeles, Oakland, San Diego, Miami, Houston, and in the Caribbean.[1]

Initially, crack had higher purity than street powder.[7] Around 1984, powder cocaine was available on the street at an average of 55 percent purity for $100 per gram (equivalent to $241 in 2018), and crack was sold at average purity levels of 80-plus percent for the same price.[1] In some major cities, such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Houston and Detroit, one dose of crack could be obtained for as little as $2.50 (equivalent to $6.04 in 2018).[1]

According to the 1985–1986 National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report, crack was available in Los Angeles, New Orleans, Memphis, Philadelphia, New York City, Houston, San Diego, San Antonio, Seattle, Baltimore, Portland, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Detroit, Chicago, Minneapolis-Saint Paul, Milwaukee, St. Louis, Atlanta, Oakland, Kansas City, Miami, Newark, Boston, San Francisco, Albany, Buffalo, and Dallas.

In 1985, cocaine-related hospital emergencies rose by 12 percent, from 23,500 to 26,300. In 1986, these incidents increased 110 percent, from 26,300 to 55,200. Between 1984 and 1987, cocaine incidents increased to 94,000. By 1987, crack was reported to be available in the District of Columbia and all but four states in the United States.[1]

Some scholars have cited the crack 'epidemic' as an example of a moral panic, noting that the explosion in use and trafficking of the drug actually occurred after the media coverage of the drug as an 'epidemic'.[8]

Impact by region[edit]

In a study done by Roland Fryer, Steven Levitt and Kevin Murphy, a crack index was calculated using information on cocaine-related arrests, deaths, and drug raids, along with low birth rates and media coverage in the United States. The crack index aimed to create a proxy for the percentage of cocaine related incidents that involved crack. Crack was a virtually unknown drug until 1985. This abrupt introductory date allows for the estimation and use of the index with the knowledge that values prior to 1985 are zero.[dubious][9] This index showed that the Northeast U.S. was most affected by the crack epidemic. The U.S. cities with the highest crack index were New York, Newark and Philadelphia.

The same index used by Fryer, Levitt and Murphy[10] was then implemented in a study that investigated the impacts of crack cocaine across the United States. In cities with populations over 350,000 the instances of crack cocaine were twice as high as those in cities with a population less than 350,000. These indicators show that the use of crack cocaine was most impactful in urban areas.

States and regions with concentrated urban populations were affected at a much higher rate, while states with primarily rural populations were least affected.[citation needed] Maryland, New York and New Mexico had the highest instances of crack cocaine, while Idaho, Minnesota and Vermont had the lowest instances of crack cocaine use.[citation needed]

Crime[edit]

Between 1984 and 1989, the homicide rate for black males aged 14 to 17 more than doubled, and the homicide rate for black males aged 18 to 24 increased nearly as much. During this period, the black community also experienced a 20–100% increase in fetal death rates, low birth-weight babies, weapons arrests, and the number of children in foster care.[11] The United States remains the largest overall consumer of narcotics in the world as of 2014.[12][13]

A 2018 study found that the crack epidemic had long-run consequences for crime, contributing to the doubling of the murder rate of young black males soon after the start of the epidemic, and that the murder rate was still 70 percent higher 17 years after crack's arrival.[14] The paper estimated that eight percent of the murders in 2000 are due to the long-run effects of the emergence of crack markets, and that the elevated murder rates for young black males can explain a significant part of the gap in life expectancy between black and white males.[14]

The reasons for these increases in crime were mostly because distribution for the drug to the end-user occurred mainly in low-income inner city neighborhoods. This gave many inner-city residents the opportunity to move up the 'economic ladder' in a drug market that allowed dealers to charge a low minimum price.

Crack cocaine use and distribution became popular in cities that were in a state of social and economic chaos such as Los Angeles and Atlanta. 'As a result of the low-skill levels and minimal initial resource outlay required to sell crack, systemic violence flourished as a growing army of young, enthusiastic inner-city crack sellers attempt to defend their economic investment.'[15] Once the drug became embedded in the particular communities, the economic environment that was best suited for its survival caused further social disintegration within that city.


Sentencing disparities[edit]

In 1986, the U.S. Congress passed laws that created a 100 to 1 sentencing disparity for the possession or trafficking of crack when compared to penalties for trafficking of powder cocaine,[2][3][4][5] which had been widely criticized as discriminatory against minorities, mostly African-Americans, who were more likely to use crack than powder cocaine.[6] This 100:1 ratio had been required under federal law since 1986.[16] Persons convicted in federal court of possession of 5 grams of crack cocaine received a minimum mandatory sentence of 5 years in federal prison. On the other hand, possession of 500 grams of powder cocaine carries the same sentence.[3][4] In 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act cut the sentencing disparity to 18:1.[6]

In the year 2000, the number of incarcerated African Americans had become 26 times the amount it had been in 1983.[citation needed]

In 2012, 88% of imprisonments from crack cocaine were African American. Further, the data shows the discrepancy between lengths of sentences of crack cocaine and heroin. The majority of crack imprisonments are placed in the 10–20 year range, while the imprisonments related to heroin use or possession range from 5–10 years which has led many to question and analyze the role race plays in this disparity.[17]

Post epidemic commentary[edit]

Writer and lawyer Michelle Alexander's book The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness argues that punitive laws against drugs like crack cocaine adopted under the Reagan Administration's War on drugs resulted in harsh social consequences, including large numbers of young black men imprisoned for long sentences, the exacerbation of drug crime despite a decrease in illegal drug use in the United States, increased police brutality against the black community resulting in injury and death for many black men, women, and children.[18]

According to Alexander, society turned into a racist criminal justice system to avoid exhibiting obvious racism. Since African Americans were the majority users of crack cocaine, it provided a platform for the government to create laws that were specific to crack. This was an effective way to imprison black people without having to do the same to white Americans. Thus, there was a discourse of African Americans and a perpetuated narrative about crack addiction that was villainous and problematic. The criminalizing of African American crack users was portrayed as dangerous and harmful to society.

Alexander writes that felony drug convictions for crack cocaine fell disproportionately on young black men, who then lost access to voting, housing, and employment opportunities. These economic setbacks led to increased violent crime in poor black communities as families did what they had to do to survive.

Alexander explains the process of someone who is caught with crack: first, the arrest and the court hearing that will result in jail or prison-time. Second, the aftermath of permanent stigmas attached to someone who has done jail-time for crack, like being marked a felon on their record. This impacts job opportunity, housing opportunity, and creates obstacles for people who are left with little motivation to follow the law, making it more likely that they will be arrested again.

Dark Alliance series[edit]

San Jose Mercury News journalist Gary Webb sparked national controversy with his 1996 Dark Alliance series which alleged that the influx of Nicaraguan cocaine started and significantly fueled the 1980s crack epidemic.[19] Investigating the lives and connections of Los Angeles crack dealers Ricky Ross, Oscar Danilo Blandón, and Norwin Meneses, Webb alleged that profits from these crack sales were funneled to the CIA-supported Contras.

The United States Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General rejected Webb's claim that there was a 'systematic effort by the CIA to protect the drug trafficking activities of the Contras'. The DOJ/OIG reported: 'We found that Blandon and Meneses were plainly major drug traffickers who enriched themselves at the expense of countless drug users and the communities in which these drug users lived, just like other drug dealers of their magnitude. They also contributed some money to the Contra cause. But we did not find that their activities were the cause of the crack epidemic in Los Angeles, much less in the United States as a whole, or that they were a significant source of support for the Contras.'[20]

Influence on popular culture[edit]

In documentary films[edit]

  • High on Crack Street: Lost Lives in Lowell (1995)
  • Cocaine Cowboys (2006)
  • Crackheads Gone Wild (2006)
  • American Drug War: The Last White Hope (2007)
  • Freakonomics (2010)
  • Planet Rock: The Story of Hip-Hop and the Crack Generation (2011)[21]
  • The Seven Five (2014)
  • Freeway: Crack in the System (2015)
  • 13th (2016)

In documentary serials[edit]

  • Drugs, Inc. (2010–present)

Snowfall (produced by FX)

In film[edit]

Crack
  • Death Wish 4: The Crackdown (1987)
  • Colors (1988)
  • King of New York (1990)
  • New Jack City (1991)
  • Boyz n the Hood (1991)
  • Deep Cover (1992)
  • Menace II Society (1993)
  • Above the Rim (1994)
  • Fresh (1994)
  • Dead Presidents (1995)
  • Belly (1998)
  • Streetwise (1998)
  • Training Day (2001)
  • Paid in Full (2002)
  • Shottas (2002)
  • The Wire (2002)
  • Dark Blue (2002)
  • Get Rich or Die Tryin' (2005)
  • Notorious (2009)
  • Life Is Hot in Cracktown (2009)
  • Moonlight (2016)
  • Snowfall (2017)

In video games[edit]

  • Narc (1988)
  • Grand Theft Auto: Vice City (2002)
  • Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas (2004)
  • Grand Theft Auto: Vice City Stories (2006)
  • Scarface: Money. Power. Respect. (2006)
  • Scarface: The World Is Yours (2006)
  • Hotline Miami (2012)

Research books[edit]

  • Sudhir Venkatesh (Indian American sociologist scholar and reporter)
    • Freakonomics (2005) – Chapter: 'Why Do Drug Dealers Still Live With Their Moms'
    • American Project. The Rise and Fall of a Modern Ghetto, Harvard University Press, 2000
    • Off the Books. The Underground Economy of the Urban Poor, Harvard University Press, 2006
    • Gang Leader for a Day: A Rogue Sociologist Takes to the Streets, Penguin Press, 2008
    • Floating City: A Rogue Sociologist Lost and Found in New York's Underground Economy, Penguin Press, 2013

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ abcdefgh'DEA History Book, 1876–1990' (drug usage & enforcement), US Department of Justice, 1991, USDoJ.gov webpage: DoJ-DEA-History-1985-1990.
  2. ^ abJim Abrams (July 29, 2010). 'Congress passes bill to reduce disparity in crack, powder cocaine sentencing'. Washington Post.
  3. ^ abcBurton-Rose (ed.), 1998: pp. 246–247
  4. ^ abcElsner, Alan (2004). Gates of Injustice: The Crisis in America's Prisons. Saddle River, New Jersey: Financial Times Prentice Hall. p. 20. ISBN0-13-142791-1.
  5. ^ abUnited States Sentencing Commission (2002). 'Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy'(PDF). p. 6. Archived from the original(PDF) on July 15, 2007. Retrieved August 24, 2010. As a result of the 1986 Act .. penalties for a first-time cocaine trafficking offense: 5 grams or more of crack cocaine = five-year mandatory minimum penalty
  6. ^ abc'The Fair Sentencing Act corrects a long-time wrong in cocaine cases', The Washington Post, August 3, 2010. Retrieved September 30, 2010.
  7. ^The word 'street' is used as an adjective meaning 'not involving an official business location or permanent residence' such as: 'sold on the street' or 'street people' in reference to people who live part-time along streets.
  8. ^Reinarman, C. and Levine, H. (1989). 'The Crack Attack: Politics and Media in America's Latest Drug Scare'. In J. Best (ed.). Images of Issues: Typifying Contemporary Social Problems. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link) see also Reeves, J. L. and Campbell, R. (1994). Cracked Coverage: Television News, the Anti-Cocaine Crusade, and the Reagan Legacy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
  9. ^Beverly Xaviera Watkins, et al. 'Arms against Illness: Crack Cocaine and Drug Policy in the United States.' Health and Human Rights, vol. 2, no. 4, 1998, pp. 42–58.
  10. ^Fryer, Roland G., et al. 'Measuring Crack Cocaine And Its Impact.' Economic Inquiry, vol. 51, no. 3, July 2013, pp. 1651–1681., doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00506.x.
  11. ^Fryer, Roland (April 2006). 'Measuring Crack Cocaine and Its Impact'(PDF). Harvard University Society of Fellows: 3, 66. Retrieved January 4, 2016.
  12. ^How bad was Crack Cocaine? The Economics of an Illicit Drug Market. Researched by Steven D. Levitt and Kevin M. Murphy [1].
  13. ^The World FactbookArchived 2010-12-29 at the Wayback Machine. Cia.gov. Retrieved on 2014-05-12.
  14. ^ abEvans, William N; Garthwaite, Craig; Moore, Timothy J (2018). 'Guns and Violence: The Enduring Impact of Crack Cocaine Markets on Young Black Males'.Cite journal requires journal= (help)
  15. ^Inciardi, 1994
  16. ^Durbin's Fair Sentencing Act Passed By House, Sent To President For Signature, durbin.senate.gov. Retrieved September 30, 2010. Archived March 6, 2011, at the Wayback Machine
  17. ^'Conclusions'(PDF). www.bjs.gov. Retrieved 2019-08-07.
  18. ^Alexander, Michelle (2012). The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. The New Press. ISBN1595586431.
  19. ^Peter Kornbluh (Jan–Feb 1997). 'Crack, the Contras, and the CIA: The Storm Over 'Dark Alliance''. Columbia Journalism Review. Retrieved February 10, 2008.
  20. ^https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch12.htm#Chapter%20XII:
  21. ^Viera, Bené (November 26, 2011). ''Planet Rock' Shows The Power Of Hip-hop'.

Further reading[edit]

  • Reinarman, Craig; Levine, Harry G. (1997). Crack In America: Demon Drugs and Social Justice. University of California Press. ISBN978-0520202429.

External links[edit]

  • DEA History in Depth (1985–1990), The Crack Epidemic at the DEA
  • Oversight hearing of the DEA by the Subcommittee on Crime; July 29, 1999 at The House
  • 'How Bad Was Crack Cocaine?' at the Booth School of Business
  • 'Cracked up'; analysis of the epidemic at Salon
Retrieved from 'https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Crack_epidemic_in_the_United_States&oldid=916761556'
Central Intelligence Agency

A number of writers have alleged that the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved in cocaine trafficking during the 1980s. These claims have led to investigations by the United States government, including hearings and reports by the United States House of Representatives, Senate, Department of Justice, and the CIA's Office of the Inspector General. The subject remains controversial.

CIA involvement in trafficking is usually alleged to be connected to the Contra war in Nicaragua and the Iran–Contra affair during the Reagan Administration. In 1986 its spokesman acknowledged that funds from sales of cocaine smuggled into the US had helped fund the Contra rebels, but said that the smuggling was not authorized by the US government or resistance leaders.[1]

A 1986 investigation by a sub-committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (the Kerry Committee), found that 'the Contra drug links included', among other connections, '[..] payments to drug traffickers by the U.S. State Department of funds authorized by the Congress for humanitarian assistance to the Contras, in some cases after the traffickers had been indicted by federal law enforcement agencies on drug charges, in others while traffickers were under active investigation by these same agencies.'[2]

The charges of CIA involvement in Contra cocaine trafficking were revived in 1996, when a newspaper series by reporter Gary Webb in the San Jose Mercury News claimed that the trafficking had played an important role in the creation of the crack cocaine drug problem in the United States. Webb's series led to three federal investigations, none of which found evidence of any conspiracy by the CIA or its employees to bring drugs into the United States.

  • 4Dark Alliance series
  • 5Investigation after Dark Alliance

Early reports of Contra cocaine trafficking[edit]

In 1984, U.S. officials began receiving reports of Contra cocaine trafficking. Three officials told journalists that they considered these reports 'reliable.' Former Panamanian deputy health minister Dr. Hugo Spadafora, who had fought with the Contra army, outlined charges of cocaine trafficking to a prominent Panamanian official. Spadafora was later found murdered. The charges linked the Contra trafficking to Sebastián González Mendiola, who was charged with cocaine trafficking on November 26, 1984, in Costa Rica.[3]

In 1985, another Contra leader 'told U.S. authorities that his group was being paid $50,000 by Colombian traffickers for help with a 100-kilo cocaine shipment and that the money would go 'for the cause' of fighting the Nicaraguan government.' A 1985 National Intelligence Estimate revealed cocaine trafficking links to a top commander working under Contra leader Edén Pastora.[3][4][5] Pastora had complained about such charges as early as March 1985, claiming that 'two 'political figures' in Washington told him last week that State Department and CIA personnel were spreading the rumor that he is linked to drug trafficking in order to isolate his movement.'[6]

On December 20, 1985, these and other additional charges were laid out in an Associated Press article after an extensive investigation, which included interviews with 'officials from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Customs Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Costa Rica's Public Security Ministry, as well as rebels and Americans who work with them'. Five American Contra supporters who worked with the rebels confirmed the charges, noting that 'two Cuban-Americans used armed rebel troops to guard cocaine at clandestine airfields in northern Costa Rica. They identified the Cuban-Americans as members of Brigade 2506, an anti-Castro group that participated in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Several also said they supplied information about the smuggling to U.S. investigators.' One of the Americans said 'that in one ongoing operation, the cocaine is unloaded from planes at rebel airstrips and taken to an Atlantic coast port where it is concealed on shrimp boats that are later unloaded in the Miami area.'[3]

On March 16, 1986, the San Francisco Examiner published a report on the '1983 seizure of 430 pounds of cocaine from a Colombian freighter' in San Francisco; it said that a 'cocaine ring in the San Francisco Bay area helped finance Nicaragua's Contra rebels.' Carlos Cabezas, convicted of conspiracy to traffic cocaine, said that the profits from his crimes 'belonged to .. the Contra revolution.' He told the Examiner, 'I just wanted to get the Communists out of my country.' Julio Zavala, also convicted on trafficking charges, said 'that he supplied $500,000 to two Costa Rican-based Contra groups and that the majority of it came from cocaine trafficking in the San Francisco Bay area, Miami and New Orleans.'[7]

FBI probe[edit]

In April 1986, Associated Press reported on an FBI probe into Contra cocaine trafficking. According to the report, 'Twelve American, Nicaraguan and Cuban-American rebel backers interviewed by The Associated Press said they had been questioned over the past several months [about contra cocaine trafficking] by the FBI. In the interviews, some covering several days and being conducted in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Colorado and California, several of the Contra backers told AP of firsthand knowledge of cocaine trafficking.'[8]

On April 17, 1986, the Reagan administration released a three-page report stating that there were some Contra-cocaine connections in 1984 and 1985, and that these connections occurred at a time when the rebels were 'particularly hard pressed for financial support' because aid from the United States had been cut off.[1] The report said: 'We have evidence of a limited number of incidents in which known drug traffickers have tried to establish connections with Nicaraguan resistance groups' and that the drug activity took place 'without the authorization of resistance leaders.'[1]

Kerry Committee investigation[edit]

Once you set up a covert operation to supply arms and money, it's very difficult to separate it from the kind of people who are involved in other forms of trade, and especially drugs. There is a limited number of planes, pilots and landing strips. By developing a system for supply of the Contras, the US built a road for drug supply into the US.

— Former CIA agent David MacMichael[9]

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, chaired at the time by Senator John Kerry, held a series of hearings from 1987 to 1988 on drug cartels and drug money laundering in South and Central America and the Caribbean.

The Subcommittee's final report, issued in 1989, said that Contra drug links included:

  • Involvement in narcotics trafficking by individuals associated with the Contra movement.
  • Participation of narcotics traffickers in Contra supply operations through business relationships with Contra organizations.
  • Provision of assistance to the Contras by narcotics traffickers, including cash, weapons, planes, pilots, air supply services and other materials, on a voluntary basis by the traffickers.
  • Payments to drug traffickers by the U.S. State Department of funds authorized by the Congress for humanitarian assistance to the Contras, in some cases after the traffickers had been indicted by federal law enforcement agencies on drug charges, in others while traffickers were under active investigation by these same agencies.[2]

According to the report, the U.S. State Department paid over $806,000 to 'four companies owned and operated by narcotics traffickers' to carry humanitarian assistance to the Contras.[2]

Dark Alliance series[edit]

80s Crack Epidemic Black Community

From August 18–20, 1996, the San Jose Mercury News published the Dark Alliance series by Gary Webb,[10][11] which claimed:

For the better part of a decade, a San Francisco Bay Area drug ring sold tons of cocaine to the Crips and Bloodsstreet gangs of Los Angeles and funneled millions in drug profits to a Latin American guerrilla army run by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. [This drug ring] opened the first pipeline between Colombia's cocaine cartels and the black neighborhoods of Los Angeles [and, as a result,] the cocaine that flooded in helped spark a crack explosion in urban America.[12]

To support these claims, the series focused on three men: Ricky Ross, Oscar Danilo Blandón, and Norwin Meneses. According to the series, Ross was a major drug dealer in Los Angeles, and Blandón and Meneses were Nicaraguans who smuggled drugs into the U.S. and supplied dealers like Ross. The series alleged that the three had relationships with the Contras and the CIA, and that law enforcement agencies failed to successfully prosecute them largely due to their Contra and CIA connections.

Response[edit]

African Americans, especially in South Central Los Angeles where the dealers discussed in the series had been active, responded with outrage to the series' charges.[13][14]

California senators Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein also took note and wrote to CIA director John Deutch and Attorney General Janet Reno, asking for investigations into the articles.[15]Maxine Waters, the Representative for California's 35th district, which includes South-Central Los Angeles, was also outraged by the articles and became one of Webb's strongest supporters.[16] Waters urged the CIA, the Department of Justice, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to investigate.

By the end of September, three federal investigations had been announced: an investigation into the CIA allegations conducted by CIA Inspector-General Frederick Hitz, an investigation into the law enforcement allegations by Justice Department Inspector-General Michael Bromwich, and a second investigation into the CIA by the House Intelligence Committee.

On October 3, 1996, LA County Sheriff Sherman Block ordered a fourth investigation into Webb's claims that a 1986 raid on Blandón's drug organization by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department had produced evidence of CIA ties to drug smuggling and that this was later suppressed.[17]

Coverage in other papers[edit]

In early October, 1996, a front-page article in The Washington Post[18] by reporters Roberto Suro and Walter Pincus, argued that 'available information' did not support the series's claims, and that 'the rise of crack' was 'a broad-based phenomenon' driven in numerous places by diverse players. The article also discussed Webb's contacts with Ross's attorney and prosecution complaints of how Ross's defense had used Webb's series.[19]

The New York Times published two articles on the series in mid-October, both written by reporter Tim Golden. One described the series' evidence as 'thin';[14] the second, citing interviews with current and former intelligence and law-enforcement officials, questioned the importance of the drug dealers discussed in the series, both in the crack cocaine trade and in supporting the Nicaraguan Contras' fight against the Sandinista government.[20]

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The Los Angeles Times devoted the most space to the story, developing its own three-part series called The Cocaine Trail. The series ran from October 20–22, 1996, and was researched by a team of 17 reporters. The three articles in the series were written by four reporters: Jesse Katz, Doyle McManus, John Mitchell, and Sam Fulwood. The first article, by Katz, developed a different picture of the origins of the crack trade than 'Dark Alliance' had described, with more gangs and smugglers participating.[21] The second article, by McManus, was the longest of the series, and dealt with the role of the Contras in the drug trade and CIA knowledge of drug activities by the Contras.[22] McManus found Blandón and Meneses's financial contributions to Contra organizations to be significantly less than the 'millions' claimed in Webb's series, and no evidence that the CIA had tried to protect them. The third article, by Mitchell and Fulwood, covered the effects of crack on African Americans and how it affected their reaction to some of the rumors that arose after the Dark Alliance series.[23]

Mercury News response[edit]

Surprised by The Washington Post article, Mercury News executive editor Jerry Ceppos wrote to the Post defending the series.[24] The Post ultimately refused to print his letter.[25] Ceppos also asked reporter Pete Carey to write a critique of the series for publication in The Mercury News, and had the controversial website artwork changed.[24] Carey's critique appeared in mid-October and went through several of the Post criticisms of the series, including the importance of Blandón's drug ring in spreading crack, questions about Blandón's testimony in court, and how specific series allegations about CIA involvement had been, giving Webb's responses.[26]

When the Los Angeles Times series appeared, Ceppos again wrote to defend the original series. He also defended the series in interviews with all three papers.[27] The extent of the criticism, however, convinced Ceppos that The Mercury News had to acknowledge to its readers that the series had been subjected to strong criticism.[28] He did this in a column that appeared on November 3, defending the series, but also committing the paper to a review of major criticisms.[29]

Ceppos' column drew editorial responses from both The New York Times and Washington Post. An editorial in the Times, while criticizing the series for making 'unsubstantiated charges,' conceded that it did find 'drug-smuggling and dealing by Nicaraguans with at least tentative connections to the Contras' and called for further investigation.[30]

The Post response came from the paper's ombudsman, Geneva Overholser.[31] Overholser was harshly critical of the series, 'reported by a seemingly hotheaded fellow willing to have people leap to conclusions his reporting couldn't back up.' But while calling the flaws in the series 'unforgivably careless journalism,' Overholser also criticized the Post's refusal to print Ceppos' letter defending the series and sharply criticized the Post's coverage of the story. Calling the Post's overall focus 'misplaced', Overholser expressed regret that the paper had not taken the opportunity to re-examine whether the CIA had overlooked Contra involvement in drug smuggling, 'a subject The Post and the public had given short shrift.'

In contrast, the series received support from Steve Weinberg, a former executive director of Investigative Reporters and Editors. In a long review of the series' claims in the Baltimore Sun, Weinberg said: 'I think the critics have been far too harsh. Despite some hyped phrasing, 'Dark Alliance' appears to be praiseworthy investigative reporting.'[32]

After the series' publication, the Northern California branch of the national Society of Professional Journalists had voted Webb 'Journalist of the Year' for 1996.[33] Despite the controversy that soon overtook the series, and the request of one board member to reconsider, the branch's board went ahead with the award in November.

End of the series[edit]

After Ceppos' column, The Mercury News spent the next several months conducting an internal review of the story. The review was conducted primarily by editor Jonathan Krim and reporter Pete Carey, who had written the paper's first published analysis of the series. Carey ultimately decided that there were problems with several parts of the story and wrote a draft article incorporating his findings.[34]

The paper also gave Webb permission to visit Central America again to get more evidence supporting the story.[35] By January, Webb filed drafts of four more articles based on his trip, but his editors concluded that the new articles would not help shore up the original series claims.[36] The editors met with Webb several times in February to discuss the results of the paper's internal review and eventually decided to print neither Carey's draft article nor the articles Webb had filed.[37] Webb was allowed to keep working on the story and made one more trip to Nicaragua in March.

At the end of March, however, Ceppos told Webb that he was going to present the internal review findings in a column.[36] After discussions with Webb, the column was published on May 11, 1997.[38] In the column Ceppos continued to defend parts of the article, writing that the series had 'solidly documented' that the drug ring described in the series did have connections with the Contras and did sell large quantities of cocaine in inner-city Los Angeles.

But, Ceppos wrote, the series 'did not meet our standards' in four areas. 1) It presented only one interpretation of conflicting evidence and in one case 'did not include information that contradicted a central assertion of the series.' 2) The series' estimates of the money involved was presented as fact instead of an estimate. 3) The series oversimplified how the crack epidemic grew. 4) The series 'created impressions that were open to misinterpretation' through 'imprecise language and graphics.'[39]

Ceppos noted that Webb did not agree with these conclusions. He concluded: 'How did these shortcomings occur? .. I believe that we fell short at every step of our process: in the writing, editing and production of our work. Several people here share that burden .. But ultimately, the responsibility was, and is, mine.'

Investigation after Dark Alliance[edit]

80's Crack Cocaine Epidemic

Justice Department report[edit]

The Department of Justice Inspector-General's report[40] was released on July 23, 1998. According to the report's 'Epilogue', the report was completed in December 1997 but was not released because the DEA was still attempting to use Danilo Blandón in an investigation of international drug dealers and was concerned that the report would affect the viability of the investigation. When Attorney General Janet Reno determined that a delay was no longer necessary, the report was released unchanged.[41]

The report covered actions by Department of Justice employees in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the DEA, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and U.S. Attorneys' Offices. It found that 'the allegations contained in the original Mercury News articles were exaggerations of the actual facts.' After examining the investigations and prosecutions of the main figures in the series, Blandón, Meneses and Ross, it concluded: 'Although the investigations suffered from various problems of communication and coordination, their successes and failures were determined by the normal dynamics that affect the success of scores of investigations of high-level drug traffickers .. These factors, rather than anything as spectacular as a systematic effort by the CIA or any other intelligence agency to protect the drug trafficking activities of Contra supporters, determined what occurred in the cases we examined.'[42]

It also concluded that 'the claims that Blandón and Meneses were responsible for introducing crack cocaine into South Central Los Angeles and spreading the crack epidemic throughout the country were unsupported.' Although it did find that both men were major drug dealers, 'guilty of enriching themselves at the expense of countless drug users', and that they had contributed money to the Contra cause, 'we did not find that their activities were responsible for the crack cocaine epidemic in South Central Los Angeles, much less the rise of crack throughout the nation, or that they were a significant source of support for the Contras.'

Crack Epidemic Statistics

The report called several of its findings 'troubling.' It found that Blandón received permanent resident status 'in a wholly improper manner' and that for some time the Department 'was not certain whether to prosecute Meneses, or use him as a cooperating witness.' Regarding issues raised in the series' shorter sidebar stories, it found that some in the government were 'not eager' to have DEA agent Celerino Castillo 'openly probe' activities at Ilopango Airport in El Salvador, where covert operations in support of the Contras were undertaken, and that the CIA had indeed intervened in a case involving smuggler Julio Zavala. It concluded, however, that these problems were 'a far cry from the type of broad manipulation and corruption of the federal criminal justice system suggested by the original allegations.'

CIA report[edit]

The CIA Inspector-General's report was issued in two volumes. The first one, 'The California Story', was issued in a classified version on December 17, 1997, and in an unclassified version on January 29, 1998.[43] The second volume, 'The Contra Story,' was issued in a classified version on April 27, 1998, and in an unclassified version on October 8, 1998.[44]

According to the report, the Inspector-General's office (OIG) examined all information the agency had 'relating to CIA knowledge of drug trafficking allegations in regard to any person directly or indirectly involved in Contra activities.' It also examined 'how CIA handled and responded to information regarding allegations of drug trafficking' by people involved in Contra activities or support.[45]

The first volume of the report found no evidence that 'any past or present employee of CIA, or anyone acting on behalf of CIA, had any direct or indirect dealing' with Ross, Blandón, or Meneses or that any of the other figures mentioned in 'Dark Alliance' were ever employed by or associated with or contacted by the agency.[46]

It found nothing to support the claim that 'the drug trafficking activities of Blandón and Meneses were motivated by any commitment to support the Contra cause or Contra activities undertaken by CIA.' It noted that Blandón and Meneses claimed to have donated money to Contra sympathizers in Los Angeles, but found no information to confirm that it was true or that the agency had heard of it.[46]

It found no information to support the claim that the agency interfered with law enforcement actions against Ross, Blandón or Meneses.[46]

In the 623rd paragraph, the report described a cable from the CIA's Directorate of Operations dated October 22, 1982, describing a prospective meeting between Contra leaders in Costa Rica for 'an exchange in [the United States] of narcotics for arms, which then are shipped to Nicaragua.'[44][non-primary source needed] The two main Contra groups, US arms dealers, and a lieutenant of a drug ring which imported drugs from Latin America to the US west coast were set to attend the Costa Rica meeting. The lieutenant trafficker was also a Contra, and the CIA knew that there was an arms-for-drugs shuttle and did nothing to stop it.[47]

The report stated that the CIA had requested the Justice Department return $36,800 to a member of the Meneses drug ring, which had been seized by DEA agents in the Frogman raid in San Francisco. The CIA's Inspector General said the Agency wanted the money returned 'to protect an operational equity, i.e., a Contra support group in which it [CIA] had an operational interest.'[47]

The report also stated that former DEA agent Celerino Castillo III alleged that during the 1980s, Ilopango Airport in El Salvador was used by Contras for drug smuggling flights, and 'his attempts to investigate Contra drug smuggling were stymied by DEA management, the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, and the CIA'.[48]

Testimony of the CIA Inspector General[edit]

Six weeks after the declassified and heavily censored first volume of the CIA report was made public, Inspector General Frederick Hitz testified before a House congressional committee.[47] Hitz stated that:

Timbuktu software ports. Timbuktu is a discontinued remote control software product originally developed by WOS Datasystems. Remote control software allows a user to control another computer across the local network or the Internet, viewing its screen and using its keyboard and mouse as if he or she were sitting in front of it.

Volume II .. will be devoted to a detailed treatment of what was known to CIA regarding dozens of people and a number of companies connected in some fashion to the Contra program or the Contra movement that were the subject of any sort of drug trafficking allegations. Each is closely examined in terms of their relationship with CIA, the drug trafficking activity that was alleged, the actions CIA took in response to the allegations, and the extent of information concerning the allegations that was Shared with U.S. law enforcement and Congress.

As I said earlier, we have found no evidence in the course of this lengthy investigation of any conspiracy by CIA or its employees to bring drugs into the United States. However, during the Contra era, CIA worked with a variety of people to support the Contra program. These included CIA assets, pilots who ferried supplies to the Contras, as well as Contra officials and others. Let me be frank about what we are finding. There are instances where CIA did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity or take action to resolve the allegations.[49][50]

Hitz also said that under an agreement in 1982 between Ronald Reagan's Attorney General William French Smith and the CIA, agency officers were not required to report allegations of drug trafficking involving non-employees, defined as paid and non-paid 'assets'—pilots who ferried supplies to the contras, as well as contra officials and others.[49][50]

This agreement, which had not previously been revealed, came at a time when there were allegations that the CIA was using drug dealers in its controversial covert operation to bring down the leftist Sandinista government in Nicaragua.[50] Only after Congressional funds were restored in 1986 was the agreement modified to require the CIA to stop paying agents who it believed were involved in the drug trade.[47]

House committee report[edit]

The House Intelligence Committee issued its report in February 2000.[51] According to the report, it used Webb's reporting and writing as 'key resources in focusing and refining the investigation.' Like the CIA and Justice Department reports, it also found that neither Blandón, Meneses, nor Ross were associated with the CIA.[52]

Examining the support that Meneses and Blandón gave to the local Contra organization in San Francisco, the report concluded that it was 'not sufficient to finance the organization' and did not consist of 'millions', contrary to the claims of the 'Dark Alliance' series. This support 'was not directed by anyone within the Contra movement who had an association with the CIA,' and the Committee found 'no evidence that the CIA or the Intelligence Community was aware of these individuals' support.'[52] It also found no evidence to support Webb's suggestion that several other drug smugglers mentioned in the series were associated with the CIA, or that anyone associated with the CIA or other intelligence agencies was involved in supplying or selling drugs in Los Angeles.[52]

See also[edit]

In The 80s Crack Epidemic 2017

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ abc'US Concedes Contras Linked to Drugs, But Denies Leadership Involved'. Associated Press. April 17, 1986. Retrieved June 11, 2015.
  2. ^ abcSubcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Communications and International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans, and Environment of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (1989). Drugs, law enforcement, and foreign policy : A report. Washington: GPO.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  3. ^ abcBrian Barger and Robert Parry, 'Reports Link Nicaraguan Rebels to Cocaine Trafficking', Associated Press (December 20, 1985).
  4. ^Scott, Peter Dale & Marshall, Jonathan (1998). Cocaine politics: drugs, armies, and the CIA in Central America. University of California Press. pp. 8–9. ISBN978-0-520-21449-1.
  5. ^Marcy, William L. (2010). The Politics of Cocaine: How U.S. Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America. Chicago Review Press. pp. 108–109. ISBN978-1-55652-949-8.
  6. ^John E. Newhagen, 'Commander Zero blasts CIA, State Department', United Press International (March 25, 1985).
  7. ^'Report: Cocaine Ring Finances Contras', Associated Press (March 16, 1986).
  8. ^Brian Bargar and Robert Parry, 'FBI Reportedly Probes Contras on Drugs, Guns', Associated Press (April 10, 1986).
  9. ^John Lichfield and Tim Cornwell, 'America has fought the wrong war': Did US policy in central America in the 1980s assist the growth of the Colombian cocaine cartels?' The Independent (26 August 1989) p. 8.
  10. ^Webb, Gary (August 18–20, 1996). 'Dark Alliance'. San Jose Mercury News. Archived from the original on December 20, 1996.
  11. ^Many follow-ups to the original series published over the next three months are in the series archive at 'Dark Alliance: Update archive'. December 20, 1996. Archived from the original on December 20, 1996. Retrieved February 8, 2015.
  12. ^Webb, Gary (August 18, 1996). 'America's 'crack' plague has roots in Nicaragua war'. San Jose Mercury News. Archived from the original on December 20, 1996. Retrieved February 5, 2015.
  13. ^Schou 2006, p. 112.
  14. ^ abGolden, Tim (October 21, 1996). 'Though Evidence Is Thin, Tale of C.I.A. and Drugs Has a Life of Its Own'. New York Times. Retrieved January 27, 2015.
  15. ^Schou 2006, p. 116.
  16. ^Schou 2006, p. 115.
  17. ^'Los Angeles Sherrif's Department Inquiry Findings'. San Jose Mercury News. December 10, 1996. Archived from the original on April 9, 1997. Retrieved February 11, 2015.
  18. ^Suro, Roberto; Walter Pincus (October 4, 1996). 'The CIA and Crack: Evidence Is Lacking Of Alleged Plot'. Washington Post.
  19. ^This is discussed briefly in Schou 2006, p. 86.
  20. ^Golden, Tim (October 21, 1996). 'Pivotal Figures of Newspaper Series May Be Only Bit Players'. New York Times. Retrieved January 27, 2015.
  21. ^Katz, Jesse (October 20, 1996). 'Tracking the Genesis of the Crack Trade'. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved January 29, 2015.
  22. ^McManus, Doyle (October 21, 1996). 'Examining Charges of CIA Role in Crack Sales'. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved January 29, 2015.
  23. ^Mitchell, John L.; Sam Fulwood (October 22, 1996). 'History Fuels Outrage Over Crack Allegations'. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved January 30, 2015.
  24. ^ abCeppos, Jerry (October 18, 1996). 'Mercury News Executive Editor Jerry Ceppos' Letter to the Washington Post'. Dark Alliance: library. Archived from the original on April 9, 1997. Retrieved February 15, 2015.
  25. ^'Washington Post response to Mercury News Executive Editor Jerry Ceppos'. October 24, 1996. Archived from the original on March 30, 1997. Retrieved February 15, 2015.
  26. ^Carey, Pete (October 13, 1996). ''Dark Alliance' series takes on a life of its own'. San Jose Mercury News. Archived from the original on December 20, 1996. Retrieved February 5, 2015.
  27. ^Schou 2006, p. 149.
  28. ^Schou 2006, p. 153.
  29. ^Ceppos, Jerry (November 3, 1996). 'Perspective: In the eye of the storm'. San Jose Mercury News. Archived from the original on April 9, 1997. Retrieved February 5, 2015.
  30. ^'The CIA and Drugs'. The New York Times. November 5, 1996. Retrieved February 15, 2015.
  31. ^Overholser, Geneva (November 10, 1996). 'The CIA, Drugs And the Press'. Washington Post.
  32. ^Weinberg, Steve (November 17, 1996). 'Despite critics, a good story Crack and the contras'. Baltimore Sun. Retrieved February 16, 2015.
  33. ^Shepard, Alicia C. (February 1997). 'The web that Gary spun'. American Journalism Review. 19 (1). pp. 34–. Retrieved February 4, 2015.
  34. ^Schou 2006, p. 153-156.
  35. ^Schou 2006, 152.
  36. ^ abSchou 2006, p. 158.
  37. ^Schou 2006, p. 156.
  38. ^Schou 2006, p. 160.
  39. ^Ceppos, Jerry (May 11, 1997). 'To readers of our 'Dark Alliance' series'. San Jose Mercury News. Archived from the original on November 19, 1997. Retrieved February 11, 2015.
  40. ^'THE CIA-CONTRA-CRACK COCAINE CONTROVERSY: A REVIEW OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS'. Retrieved July 5, 2007.
  41. ^Bromwich, Michael R. 'CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy: Epilogue'. Retrieved February 9, 2015.
  42. ^Bromwich, Michael R. 'CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy: Conclusions'. Retrieved February 9, 2015.
  43. ^'Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General Report of Investigation Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States (96-0143-IG) Volume I: The California Story'. Central Intelligence Agency. January 29, 1998. Retrieved January 13, 2008.
  44. ^ ab'Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General Report of Investigation Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States (96-0143-IG) Volume II: The Contra Story'. Central Intelligence Agency. October 8, 1998. Retrieved January 13, 2008.
  45. ^Hitz, 'Scope of investigation.'
  46. ^ abcHitz, Vol. 1, 'Conclusions.'
  47. ^ abcdCockburn & St Clair 1999.
  48. ^'THE CIA-CONTRA-CRACK COCAINE CONTROVERSY: A REVIEW OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS'. pp. Chapter X. Retrieved July 5, 2007.
  49. ^ abFrederick P. Hitz (March 16, 1998). 'Prepared Statement of Frederick P. Hitz inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency Before The House Committee On Intelligence subject — Investigation Of allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras In Drug Trafficking to the United States'. Federal News Service. Retrieved April 22, 2006.
  50. ^ abcPincus, Walter (March 17, 1998). 'Inspector: CIA Kept Ties With Alleged Traffickers'. The Washington Post: A12.
  51. ^United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (February 2000). Report On the Central Intelligence Agency's Alleged Involvement in Crack Cocaine Trafficking in the Los Angeles Area.
  52. ^ abc'Report on Alleged Involvement: Findings' 43.

References[edit]

In The 80s Crack Epidemic Lyrics

  • Cockburn, Alexander; St Clair, Jeffrey (1999). Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs and the Press. Brooklyn, NY: Verso. ISBN978-1-85984-258-4.
  • Grim, Ryan; Sledge, Matt (October 10, 2014). 'Key Figures In CIA-Crack Cocaine Scandal Begin To Come Forward'. Huffington Post. Retrieved April 17, 2017.
  • McCoy, Alfred W. (2003). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade. Lawrence Hill Books. ISBN1-55652-483-8.
  • Schou, Nick (2006). Kill the messenger: how the CIA's crack-cocaine controversy destroyed journalist Gary Webb. Nation Books. ISBN978-1-56025-930-5.
  • Scott, Peter Dale (1998). Cocaine Politics : Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America. University of California Press. ISBN0-520-21449-8.
  • Webb, Gary (1998). Dark Alliance: The CIA, The Contras, And The Crack Cocaine Explosion. Seven Stories Press. ISBN1-888363-68-1.

In The 80s Crack Epidemic Movie

External links[edit]

  • 'Managing a Nightmare: CIA Public Affairs and the Drug Conspiracy Story'(PDF). Drug Conspiracy. Central Intelligence Agency. pp. 9–14. - Release approved on July 29, 2014

In The 80s Crack Epidemic 2017

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